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syn1postun1 
Q: Will the Supreme Court 
intervention in Florida fail 
the test of time? 
Yes: The miscarriage 
of iustice to minority 
citizens whose votes 
were discarded un-
fairly was ignored. 
By IRA 
In 1857 the U.S. Supreme Court effectively upheld the constitu-
tionality of slavery by striking down as unconstitutional a feder-
allaw that prohibited slavery in U.S. territories outside the South. 
Far worse than the decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford case itself 
was the language of the opinion supporting it. Chief Justice Roger 
B. Taney wrote that blacks were "subordinate and inferior beings" 
and that they had "no rights which the white man was bound to 
respect." 
There probably has never been a Supreme Court decision more 
crushing to the hopes and aspirations of equal-rights advocates 
than Dred Scott. But Frederick Douglass, the leading black abo-
litionist of the time, did not react with despondence or despair. 
He said: "The Supreme Court is not the only power in this world. 
We, the abolitionists and colored people, should meet this deci-
sion, unlooked for and monstrous as it appears, in a cheerful spir-
it. This very attempt to blot out forever the hopes of an enslaved 
people may be one necessary link in the chain of events prepara-
tory to the complete overthrow of the whole slave system." 
It is not necessary to equate the Supreme Court's decision on 
Dec. 12 with the Dred Scott decision- indeed, it would be 
obscene to do so. We should take Douglass' reaction as a guide 
for our own. Our nation must now rededicate itself to assuring the 
equal right to vote. In this, the Supreme Court's Dec. 12 decision 
contains a number of opportunities that the American Civil Lib-
erties Union (ACLU) will begin to address through litigation in 
the coming weeks. 
The equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment was writ-
ten in the first instance to address local and state-based racial 
inequalities. In George W Bush and Richard Cheney v. AI Gore, 
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et al., the U.S. Supreme Court discov-
ered a 14th Amendment equal-protec-
tion violation in the differential ways 
that disputed ballots were being count-
ed in Florida. But these disputed ballots 
and the methods used to evaluate them 
only arose because of the differential use 
of punch-card machines in some coun-
ties but not in others. In terms of prac-
tical impact, these and other inequalities 
almost certainly affected a greater num-
ber of votes than any inconsistencies that might have arisen from 
the manual recount that was under way in Florida and did so, more-
over, in a way that clearly discriminated against racial minorities. 
But it also provides an opportunity for those who truly are ded-
icated to the principles of equal protection to challenge prospec-
tively the differential use of punch-card machines in Florida and 
also across the country. If the U.S. Supreme Court claims to be 
sensitive to equal-protection problems in the area of voting, the 
ACLU is ready to accommodate it. 
Thus, if there were an equal-protection problem in Florida, it 
arose out of the racially disparate use or different voting machines, 
and was both more serious and prior to the equal-protection prob-
lem arising out of the evaluation and counting of disputed ballots. 
Indeed, the evaluation and counting of disputed ballots was a rem-
edy for the prior equal-protection problem arising out of the dif-
ferent machines. For the Supreme Court to pretend, as it did, that 
an equal-protection problem arose initially at the stage of evalu-
ation and counting disputed ballots, while it ignored the prior equal-
protection problem, exposes the intellectual dishonesty of the 
court's approach. 
According to a Dec. 1 report in the New York Times, counties 
that used punch-card machines turned out ballots that showed no 
vote for president at a far higher rate than counties that used opti-
cal-scanner machines. In 30 Florida counties that used optical scan-
ners, for example, only three-tenths of 1 percent of the ballots were 
recorded as having no presidential vote. But in 15 counties that 
used punch-card machines, 1.86 percent registered no presiden-
tial vote - more than six times the rate of optical scanners. 
(continued on page 42) 
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lot. The Miami-Dade County canvassing 
board could not agree on a standard; each 
board member applied his own. Thus, Flori-
da treated different voters differently, based 
solely on their county of residence, and no 
official explained why. It just so happened, 
however, that the county (Broward) that had 
produced the most votes for Al Gore on Nov. 
7 was applying the standard most likely to 
turn up even more. 
On Dec. 12 the U.S. Supreme Court put an end to the seeming-
ly endless Florida "reGounts" that followed the Nov. 7 presiden-
tial election. Critics have claimed that the court overstepped its 
authority and infringed "states' rights"- here, the "right'' of the 
Florida Supreme Court to order a 64-county recount without 
articulating any objective standards governing what did and did 
not constitute a "vote." Some even have questioned the legiti-
macy of the U.S. Supreme Court's action, claiming that the strong 
disagreement among the justices somehow undermines the 
authority of the decision. These criticisms, however, miss the 
mark. The court's intervention vindicated the rule of law, pre-
served the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution and should 
enhance the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. 
The Florida recounts appeared "legal" in the ordinary sense 
of that word. Duly elected canvassing boards initiated the counts, 
pursuant to their statutory authority. Courts intervened occa-
sionally, ordering boards to change their standards, extending 
deadlines and compelling further recounts. Yet, despite all 
appearances of a "legal" process, these recounts offended the rule 
of law. At a minimum, the rule of law requires the state to act 
according to the general rules that were in effect before the dis-
pute at hand. These procedural requirements of prospectivity and 
generality ensure that law is made behind a veil of ignorance, 
without reference to any particular controversy, so that law reflects 
the lawmaker's unbiased judgment about the "best" rule. A deci-
sion that does not comport with these requirements is not "legal" 
in any meaningful sense, but is instead arbitrary human action, 
with no claim to legitimacy or respect. 
The Florida recounts contravened each of the procedural 
requirements described above. A court ordered Palm Beach 
County to count "dimpled" chads as votes, in violation of the 
county's rule, promulgated in 1990, which expressly forbade the 
counting of dimples. While Broward County had no written pol-
icy, it never had counted dimples in the past. When it started its 
recount, Broward announced that it would follow prior practice 
and only count "two-corner" chads. A judge soon intervened, 
however, ordering the board to count some dimples as votes. 
Though ostensibly "legal," both of these orders changed the rules 
after the election and knowingly advantaged one candidate. Rule 
by judges replaced the "rule of law." 
Florida did not stop there, however. It also violated the prin-
ciple of generality- the requirement that like cases be treated 
alike. Palm Beach County refused to count ballots with isolat-
ed dimples as votes. Midway through its recount, however, 
Broward County relaxed its standard even further, counting such 
dimples as votes, even where the voter had punched the chad for 
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Viewed in their entirety, then, the Florida recount proceed-
ings were not legal in any sense, but were instead an exemplar 
oflawless and arbitrary state action. Unfortunately, the U.S. Con-
stitution contains no general prohibition on retroactive law-
making. (The ex post facto clause, for instance, only applies to 
criminal punishments.) The U.S. Constitution does, however, con-
tain a sort of generality requirement in the form of the equal-pro-
tection clause of the 14th Amendment. For nearly four decades, 
the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that voting is a "funda-
mental" right and that practices granting some votes more 
weight than others violate the equal-protection guarantee, unless 
a compelling interest justifies such differential treatment. This 
"one person, one vote" line of cases, which no justice questions, 
applies regardless of whether the practice at issue discriminates 
based on race. 
On Nov. 22, George W Bush petitioned the U.S. Supreme 
Court to enforce the equal-protection guarantee by requiring 
Florida to adopt uniform standards governing the ongoing 
recounts. The court refused, thus giving the Florida Supreme 
Court a chance to clean up the constitutional mess that was evolv-
ing under its supervision. Inexplicably, the Florida high court pro-
ceeded to make things worse. In its Dec. 8 order reversing Judge 
N. Sanders Sauls, four Florida Supreme Court justices ordered 
the arbitrary results of the recounts in Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, 
and Broward counties included in the final certification. More-
over, the court ordered a count of the ''undervotes" in the 64 Flori-
da counties that had not completed recounts. In so doing, the court 
rejected Bush's claim that the equal-protection clause required 
a uniform standard, vaguely admonishing 64 counties to deter-
mine the "clear intent of the voter." This, of course, was the same 
"standard" purportedly followed by Palm Beach, Miami-Dade 
and Broward counties. 
Within hours of this decision, Bush's lawyers implored Leon 
County Circuit Judge Terry Lewis, who was overseeing the 
recounts, to set a uniform standard. Lewis refused, leaving each 
county free to recount the undervotes however it saw fit. Stan-
dards began to multiply, as Hillsborough County- which had 
narrowly gone for Bush - announced that it actually would 
adhere to its customary approach and not count dimples. Four 
different counties had produced four different standards. The 
process was getting more, not less, arbitrary. 
It was at this point that the U.S. Supreme Court finally 
stepped in, ordering a halt to the lawless spectacle unfolding on 
Dec. 9. Although only five justices voted for the initial stay, seven 
ultimately agreed with Bush that the recount ordered by the Flori-
(continued on page 42) 
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Overall, according to the Times, voters using the now infamous 
Votomatic machines showed no vote for president at a rate five 
times higher than voters using optical scanners. It defies reason 
to suggest that voters in counties using punch-card systems will-
fully decided not to vote for president at a rate five to six times 
higher than citizens in counties using optical scanners. 
Moreover, these disparities had a clear racial sub text. Accord-
ing to the Times, 64 percent ofFlorida's black voters live in coun-
ties that used punch-card systems, which are cheaper, while 56 
percent of whites do. Sixty-three percent of Gore's vote, which 
included heavy majorities among black vot-
Florida, it was 31.2 percent -more than 200,000 citizens. The 
majority of these felonies were nonviolent offenses, many, if not 
most, for nonviolent drug offenses. 
The explosion of drug-war arrests and convictions in recent 
years has led to an explosion of felony disenfranchisement. And 
the racial profiling inherent in how the drug war is enforced has 
been reflected in a racial disproportion in felony disenfran-
chisement. According to the federal government's own statistics, 
approximately 13 percent of all monthly drug users are black 
(about their proportion in the population), while 35 percent of 
arrests for nonviolent drug offenders are 
ers, were counted on punch-card machines 
while only 55 percent of Bush's vote was. 
This pattern was reversed in votes tallied by 
optical scanners. 
There are other issues besides those raised 
by the racially disparate rejection of ballots 
by different machines. In Florida, according 
to the Times, some counties, mostly heavily 
white, had computers to relieve the problem 
of voters whose valid registration information 
was not available at the precinct, while other 
counties, mostly black, did not. Since Flori-
da does not allow for provisional voting in 
There are other 
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rejection of ballots 
by different 
machines. 
black, as are 55 percent of convictions 
and 74 percent of prisoners. These dis-
proportions are indefensible and lead to 
similar disproportions in felony disen-
franchisement. 
Moreover, prisoners and former felons 
no longer under the jurisdiction of the 
criminal-justice system are counted for the 
purposes of determining the number of a 
state's congressional representation and 
Electoral College votes, even though they 
are not allowed to vote. This, of course, is 
such cases, black voters disproportionately were rejected, even 
though eligible. 
In addition, disproportionate numbers of minority voters were 
purged from the voter rolls prior to the election based on alleged 
felony records that were never verified. A data-service firm hired 
by the Republican Party apparently provided a list of8,000 "pos-
sible felons," which local election officials had no time to inves-
tigate and did not investigate. But they did disqualify the 8,000, 
who were heavily minority. 
Aside from inaccurate felony records, there is the issue of felony 
disenfranchisement itself. Throughout the nation, 13 percent of 
all African-American men are barred from voting as the result of 
prior felonies. In the South, the percentage is about 30 percent. In 
like the three-fifths compromise that 
counted slaves for the purposes of determining the number of rep-
resentatives and Electoral College votes while in other respects 
treating them like chattel and denying them all rights, including 
the right to vote. 
Looking forward, our country must identify these problems sys-
tematically to see where and to what extent they and other simi-
lar problems exist and fashion a comprehensive plan to remedy 
them. The ACLU is fully prepared to propel these remedies 
through legal challenges, legislation and public campaigns to 
ensure that the principle of equal protection in voting so recently 
embraced by the conservative majority of the court does, indeed, 
apply to all people, regardless of race, color or previous condition 
of servitude. • 
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da Supreme Court offended the equal-protection clause. In an 
opinion joined by Justice Stephen Breyer, Justice David Souter 
put it best: "I can conceive of no legitimate state interest served 
by these differing treatments of the expressions of voters' fun-
damental rights. The differences appear wholly arbitrary." The 
two dissenters on this point were entirely unpersuasive. Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg reminded us that it was "an imperfect 
world" and asserted that an arbitrary, standardless recount was 
better than none. Justice John Paul Stevens claimed that any con-
stitutional shortcomings could be eliminated by trusting - but 
not requiring - Judge Lewis to rule on individual written objec-
tions to each decision to count or not to count a particular bal-
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lot. Whether and how a judge who had just refused to set uni-
form standards would voluntarily reverse course and ensure uni-
formity in this ex post facto fashion was anybody's guess. 
Despite their agreement that the standardless statewide 
recount contravened the equal protection clause, Breyer and 
Souter split with the majority over the question of remedy. The 
majority took at face value the Florida Supreme Court's con-
clusion that the Florida Legislature intended any contest to end 
on Dec. 12. Further recounts, then, would thwart the legisla-
tive will and thus violate Article II of the Constitution. Souter 
and Breyer, in contrast, would have given the Florida Supreme 
Court the opportunity to order recounts of all undervotes, 
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including those in Broward and Palm Beach counties, under a 
uniform standard. Neither of these justices explained how 
these recounts could be consistent with the Florida Supreme 
Court's prior pronouncements about the Dec. 12 deadline and, 
by extension, Article II. 
The claim that the majority decision somehow interfered 
with "states' rights" would be a strong one if it had been made 
in 1858, when the federal government was without authority 
to ensure equality between its citizens. Important events -
including the Civil War and the adoption 
government. In the end, a court's legitimacy depends upon its 
ability to articulate a convincing legal rationale for its decision. 
The five justices who joined the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore 
did just that, and they apparently believed that their oath required 
them to do their constitutional duty as they saw it, instead ofbro-
kering a political compromise designed to gain additional votes. 
In the long run, such fidelity to constitutional principle will 
enhance the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. 
To be sure, the rationale offered by the majority already has 
come under attack from academics and 
of the 14th Amendment- have inter-
vened since then, radically altering the 
federal-state balance. By its very nature, 
the equal-protection clause requires the 
U.S. Supreme Court to second-guess state 
actions - including judicial decisions 
- that treat citizens differently for arbi-
trary reasons. The whole point of the 
"one person, one vote" decisions is that 
states have no right to treat the votes of one 
person differently from the votes of 
another. Taken to its logical (and horrifY-
ing) conclusion, a preference for states' 
The Florida recount 
proceedingslVere 
not legal, but 
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examplar of lalVIess 
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state action. 
others who claim that the court's five 
more conservative justices put an end to 
lawless recounts for political reasons. 
This drumbeat of criticism may lead non-
experts to question the correctness, and 
thus the legitimacy, of the result. But the 
general public should understand that 
individuals who comment on tl1e work of 
the Supreme Court are not always neutral, 
dispassionate experts. Most members of 
the legal professoriat, for instance, are far 
left or left of center: few voted for George 
rights over equal protection would empower states to reinsti-
tute segregation. 
Certainly, the majority would have preferred unanimous 
agreement with its decision. Legitimacy, however, is not anum-
bers game. The authority of judges and the concomitant power 
of judicial review rests upon the law, in this case the supreme 
law contained in the U.S. Constitution. A judicial opinion that 
flouts this law does not become legitimate because it is unani-
mous or nearly so. (The doctrine of "separate but equal" 
announced in Plessy v. Ferguson did not derive one iota oflegit-
imacy from the 7-1 vote that embraced it.) Conversely, an opin-
ion that is correct does not become suspect because four dis-
senting justices get things wrong. West Coast Hotels v. Parrish, 
which rejected constitutional attacks on the minimum wage, was 
decided 5-4, with the dissenters declaring an end to constitutional 
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W Bush, and most share Gore's admira-
tion for an evolving Constitution. 
Many of these scholars hoped that Gore as president would 
appoint judges who would use the Constitution to advance their 
political agendas by voiding the death penalty, expanding the 
right to abortion and ignoring constitutional limits on congres-
sional power. (So much for legitimacy and states' rights!) The 
true measure of the majority's decision will not be found in the 
opinion of partisan professors. 
The legitimacy of governmental action depends upon adher-
ence to the rule of law, and the Florida recounts did not pass 
this test. By voiding the arbitrary and standardless recounts 
ordered by the Florida Supreme Court, the U.S . Supreme 
Court's majority vindicated the rule of law and discharged its 
obligation to the Constitution as it understood it. We should have 
expected no less. • 
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